Three Temporalities: Toward a Sociology of the Event by Sewell, William H. Jr.
"Three Temporalities: 
Toward a Sociology 
of the Eventn 
William Sewell 
CSST Working CRSO Working 
Paper #58 Paper #448 
October 1990 
THREE TEMPORALITIES: 
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF THE EVENT 
William H. Sewell, Jr. 
University of Chicago 
Presented at a conference on "The Historic Turn in the Human 
Sciences," at the University of Michigan, October 1990. 
Please do not cite or quote without permission. 
THREE TEMPORALITIES: 
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF THE EVENT 
Historical approaches have made remarkable strides in 
American sociology over the past two decades. Through most of 
the 1960s, sociology in the United States was utterly dominated 
by research on contemporary America. But the civil rights and 
antiwar movements made graduate students trained in the 1960s and 
early 1970s far more interested than their elders in questions of 
conflict, revolution, and social change. Rather than seeking 
timeless laws of the operation of American society -- which was 
implicitly equated with society in general -- a new generation 
began to ask how the worldts different societies have been 
transformed under the impact of capitalism and Western 
domination. The ideas pioneered by such intrepid historical 
explorers as Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, and Immanuel 
Wallerstein were, consequently, taken up by scores of young 
sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s.l 
By the early 1980s, historical sociology was recognizable as 
a major node of growth in the profession. Its prominence has 
been institutionalized by the formation of two historically 
inclined official sections of the American Sociological 
Association: a Comparative Historical Sociology Section, which a 
sociologist friend of mine aptly characterizes as "left 
Weberian," and a Political Economy of the World System Section, 
which is predominantly Wallersteinian.2 Although it is doubtful 
whether historical approaches will ever become dominant in the 
discipline, their growing prominence already has significantly 
changed the contours of American sociology. 
The leading manifestoes and programmatic statements of 
historical sociologists have generally been concerned with 
methodological issues, and above all with comparative method.3 
The title "Comparative Historical SociologytW adopted by the 
historical sociologists as the label for their ASA section, is 
emblematic; it places as much emphasis on comparative method as 
on historical subject matter. In this respect, historical 
sociologists reveal themselves to be right in the mainstream of 
American sociology. By stressing comparative method, they 
participate eagerly in the disciplinets obsessive concern to 
justify itself as a science; comparative method, after all, is 
the standard alternative to mainstream statistical methods when 
the number of cases is insufficiently large. This mode of self- 
presentation has helped to make historical research acceptable to 
the rest of the profession. Historical sociology, this rhetoric 
implies, poses no particular theoretical or epistemological 
threat; it is simply the sociology of the past, carried on by 
means as close as feasible to the sociology of the present. 
It is not hard to see why historical sociologists have been 
so self-consciousness about method; after all, they have 
virtually always had to make careers in departments where they 
were surrounded by skeptical positivists vigilantly on guard 
against humanist tendencies. The emphasis on methodology has 
surely helped historical sociology to establish its secure 
beachhead in the profession. But it has also served to obscure 
some of the potentially radical implications of sociology8s 
"historic turn." I believe that historical sociology is now 
sufficiently secure to risk examining some of these implications 
in public. In this spirit, shall I attempt to spell out what I 
see as deep but as yet largely unvoiced challenges that 
historical sociology poses to the disciplinary mainstream. 
Until recently, few historical sociologists have had much to 
say about what makes their sociology historical. If historical 
sociology is merely the sociology of the past, it is valuable 
above all because it increases the available number of data- 
points. Many social processes require a significant period of 
time to work themselves out; if we investigate such processes 
only in the present, we not only risk studying incomplete 
sequences, but greatly restrict the number of cases. But is 
history just a matter of more data-points? Doesn't making 
sociology historical imply introducing ideas of temporality that 
are radically foreign to normal sociological thinking?4 I 
maintain that the answer to this question depends on the how 
temporality is conceptualized. The currently dominant modes of 
conceptualizing temporality in historical sociology -- what I 
will call mteleologicalw and wexperimentalgl temporality -- 
minimize the challenge to mainstream sociology. But a third, 
currently subordinate, conceptualization -- what I will call 
nevenementialv temporality -- is potentially much more 
subversive.5 I shall argue that the dominant teleological and 
experimental concepts of temporality are seriously deficient, 
indeed actually fallacious, and that historical sociology needs 
to adopt the much more subversive evenemential notion of 
temporality -- which sees the course of history as determined by 
a succession of largely contingent events. 
Teleological Temporality 
Sociology was born under the sign of teleology. The great 
nineteenth-century founders, for example, Comte, Marx, Durkheim, 
and Tonnies, saw history as the temporal working out of an 
inherent logic of social development -- from religious to 
metaphysical to scientific eras, or from feudalism to capitalism 
to socialism, or from mechanical to organic solidarity, or from 
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. For these social theorists, 
history was shaped by transhistorical progressive laws. The 
direction and meaning of history were a consequence not of the 
largely contingent events that made up the surface of history, 
but of long-term, anonymous causal forces, of which particular 
historical events were at best manifestations. The waning of the 
nineteenth century's virtually universal faith in progress has 
gradually resulted in an abandonment of explicit teleology in 
sociological thought. But weaker forms of teleology are still 
very much with us. 
A teleological explanation is the attribution of the cause 
of an historical happening neither to the actions and reactions 
that constitute the happening, nor to concrete and specifiable 
conditions that shape or constrain the actions and reactions, but 
rather to abstract transhistorical processes leading to some 
future historical state. Events in some historical present, in 
other words, are actually explained by events in the future. 
Such explanatory strategies, however fallacious, are surprisingly 
common in recent sociological writing and are far from rare in 
the works of social historians. They are implied, for example, 
by the common practice of labeling political or social movements 
as backward-looking and forward-looking. gtBackward-looking" 
movements, in normal usage, are those that value some aspect of a 
given period's life and culture that the analyst, with her or his 
twenty-twenty hindsight, regards as doomed to the dust-bin of 
history, whereas wforward-looking" movements are those valuing 
aspects of a period's life and culture that turned out to have a 
bright future. The simple act of labelling movements in this way 
contains an implicit teleological explanation of their 
histories.6 Likewise the term "modernn often serves as a label 
for those processes or agents that are deemed by the analyst to 
be doing the work of the future in some present, while 
"traditionalw labels those equally current forces in the present 
that the analyst regards as doing the work of the past. The 
entire modernization school of social science is based on such a 
teleological conceptualization of temporality. But the 
teleological fallacy is also widespread in the work of many 
historical sociologists who regard their work as arising out of 
an uncompromising critique of modernization theory. I shall try 
to demonstrate this claim by briefly examining the work of two 
historical sociologists who were particularly influential in 
overthrowing the theoretical approaches of the modernization 
school and replacing them with those of contemporary historical 
sociology: Immanuel Wallerstein and Charles Tilly. 
Immanuel Wallerstein as Bocial Astronomer 
Wallerstein is by far the clearer case. In his multi-volume 
history of ,the modern world-system, Wallerstein proves himself no 
less anxious than other sociologists to find a secure scientific 
warrant for his knowledge. But because his object of study is 
vast and singular -- the capitalist flworld-systemN -- the usual 
quantitative and experimental scientific models are hardly 
appropriate; there are no other units with which the modern 
world-system could appropriately be compared. Wallerstein 
discussed this dilemma in the introduction to his first volume. 
He worried out loud that there was "only one instancew of his 
"unit of analysisgt and that if this were true he might be reduced 
to merely writing its history. He "was not interested in writing 
its history;" he wanted to discover its laws. 
But can there be laws about the unique? In a rigorous 
sense, there of course cannot be. A statement of causality 
or probability is made in terms of a series of like 
phenomena or like instances.. ..There had only been one 
Itmodern world.tt Maybe one day there would be discovered to 
be comparable phenomena on other planets, or additional 
modern world-systems on this one. But here and now, the 
reality was clear -- only one. 
Wallerstein rescued the scientific status of his enterprise 
by an inspired analogy. If the capitalist world-system is one of 
a kind, Wallerstein reasoned, its study can be modeled on a fully 
recognized and powerful natural science that investigates the 
unique development a singular system: astronomy, or, more 
precisely, cosmology, that branch of astronomy that studies the 
physical universe as a whole. I1What," Wallerstein asked himself, 
"do astronomers do?" 
As I understand it, the logic of their arguments involves 
two separate operations. They use the laws derived from the 
study of smaller physical entities, the laws of physics, and 
argue that (with perhaps certain specified exceptions) these 
laws hold by analogy for the system as a whole. Second, 
they argue a posteriori. If the whole system is to have a 
given state at time y, it most probably had a given state at 
time x.7 
This analogy with cosmology, I would argue, crucially shaped 
Wallersteinfs intellectual project, although it did so in part by 
creative misapplication. It suggested a close relationship 
between part and whole, where laws found in investigations of 
local phenomena are also assumed to operate at the level of the 
whole. This key assumption -- that local and global processes 
partake of the same causalities -- was profoundly enabling. It 
provided Wallerstein with a powerfully unified perspective, one 
that authorized him to see all sorts of local events in various 
times and places as determined not by the accidents of local 
conditions, but by the dynamics of the world economy of which 
they were a part. I believe that it was above all this unique 
perspective -- this ability to see the dynamic of the whole at 
work in the dynamics of the parts -- that established 
Wallersteints reputation as a great historical sociologist and 
that attracted an entire school of followers. 
But in applying the astronomers' assumption about the 
uniformity of causalities to the world system, Wallerstein 
essentially reversed the direction of the part-whole 
relationship. In astronomy the physical principles discovered in 
studies of small-scale earth-bound matter -- whether these be 
Galilleots laws of falling bodies or the findings of contemporary 
particle physics -- are assumed to apply equally to cosmic matter -- to the orbits of planets, or to nuclear reactions in stellar 
cores. Indeed, such laws are assumed to operate at the level of 
the universe as a whole: the great cosmological question of 
whether the universe will expand indefinitely or eventually 
collapse in on itself hinges on calculations of the aggregate 
gravitational pull of the entire mass of matter in the cosmos. 
Astronomy today, as at the time of Newton, remains an example of 
reductionist science at its most awesomely successful. In 
contemporary astronomy, the key to the dynamics of the infinitely 
large is found in the dynamics of the infinitely small. 
But Wallerstein rejects models, whether derived from 
behaviorist psychology or microeconomics, that would explain the 
dynamics of the world system by the principles governing its 
smallest entities -- human individuals. Nor does he argue that 
the dynamics of local communities provide the key to the 
understanding the development of world society. His point is 
precisely the opposite: that the fates of local societies are 
determined not by local causes but by the operation of global, 
system-level, causes. The key to understanding the history of 
Poland or Peru is to recognize their place in the world-systemic 
division of labor -- as peripheral societies dependent on the 
core. But once we have begun to explain spatially and temporally 
localized events as a consequence of their place in a totality of 
world evolution, we are perilously close to teleological 
explanation. 
Wallersteinls misapplied astronomical analogy also 
encouraged teleology in another, more direct, way. He felt 
authorized by astronomy to argue a posteriori, to argue back from 
the recent or current state of the capitalist world-system to its 
prior state. Most spectacularly, the astronomers project the 
current velocities of galaxies backward to argue for the 
existence of a "big bangw at the beginning of time, a primal 
cosmic event that determined the subsequent character and 
evolution of the physical universe. Wallerstein the social 
astronomer devises what in effect is a "big bang" theory of the 
origins of capitalism. A European economy already in crisis as a 
consequence of the disintegration of feudalism was decisively 
launched on a new and inexorable dynamic by the European 
geographical expansion known as "the great discoverie~.~ The 
discoveries, according to Wallerstein, established the key 
economic, geographical, and political relationships on which the 
subsequent development of capitalism has been predicated -- a 
spatially differentiated world economy too large to be controlled 
by any of the competing political units of which it was composed. 
Once again, Wallersteinls misapplication of the analogy with 
astronomy has served him both well and badly. I am convinced 
that the particular economic-geographical-political dynamic 
identified by Wallerstein is indeed crucial in the development of 
world capitalism, and that it was decisively set in motion by the 
discoveries. But Wallersteinls vision of all the subsequent 
development of capitalism as somehow inherent in his initial big 
bang warps his understanding both of the discoveries and of 
subsequent developments. His work contains some astute 
evenemential analysis of the political and economic history of 
Europe in his period, although his rhetoric suppresses the 
narrative's evenemential qualities. His discussions of how 
marginal and tiny Portugal became the initiator of the voyages of 
discovery, of how the Hapsburgs attempted but failed to gain a 
political hegemony that would encompass the world economy, or of 
how the Dutch Revolt made possible the development of crucial new 
commercial and financial institutions in the Netherlands are 
actually full of contingency, unanticipated consequences, and 
fateful choices. But in Wallersteints analysis, the 
contingencies, choices, and consequences are foreordained by the 
necessity built into the world-system from the moment of its 
creation. Hidden behind Wallersteinls big bang theory is a far 
more interesting account of how the crucial but open-ended event 
of the discoveries initiated a long chain of subsequent open- 
ended events -- that eventually.and far from inevitably led to 
the emergence of a'capitalist world economy. 
It was the misapplication of Wallersteinfs analogy that led 
him down the path to teleology. What makes the astronomerst a 
posteriori reasoning scientifically acceptable is the 
plausibility of the assumption that just as the laws of physics 
hold true across space they also hold true across time. If the 
laws of motion, gravity, and high-energy physics can be projected 
backwards in time, then it is possible to deduce the timing and 
characteristics of the big bang that propelled the universe into 
its current dynamics, or the state of the universe ten minutes 
after the big bang or a hundred billion years from now. But we 
know that human beings and the societies they create are far more 
perverse than physical matter. Humans, unlike planets, galaxies, 
or sub-atomic particles, are capable of assessing the structures 
in which they exist and of acting -- with imperfectly predictable 
consequences -- in ways that change them. While there certainly 
are turning points or crucial events in human history, there can 
not be big bangs. To construct historical arguments on an 
analogy with astronomy results in a teleology in which some 
crucial past event is misconstrued as a pure origin that contains 
the entire future of the social system in potentia, and in which 
the partially contingent events that occur subsequently are 
robbed of their effectivity and reduced to the status of markers 
on the road to the inevitable future. 
Charles Tilly and the Master Processes of History 
Teleology plays a far less obvious roie in Tillyts work than 
in Wallersteinls. Nevertheless, I shall try to demonstrate that 
two of his most influe,ntial contributions -- his book on the 
Vendee rebellion and his work on the history of French collective 
violence -- contain strong doses of teleological temporality.8 
This might seem particularly curious in the case of the. The 
Vendee, which focuges on a particular event, the great counter- 
revolutionary revolt that erupted in western France in 1793. But 
Tillyls book is not a narrative history of the revolt; in fact 
his argument is introduced by a very effective polemic against 
the sociological naivete of the countless existing narrative 
histories.9 Whereas these narrative histories spoke about the 
cause of the revolt by rather cavalierly invoking the presumed 
motives of the rebels, Tilly insisted on asking properly 
sociological causal questions. He wanted to know what it was 
about the social organization of the Vendee region that led to a 
revolt there. Tillyfs principle analytical device was to compare 
two adjacent areas in western France, the Val-Saumurois, which 
supported the revolution, and the Mauges, which supported the 
counter-revolution. The principal sociological concept he used 
to analyze the difference in the social organization of these two 
areas was "urbanizationI1 -- which in Tillyfs somewhat expanded 
usage was "a collective term for a set of changes which generally 
occur with the appearance and expansion of large-scale 
coordinated activities in a so~iety.~~lO Urbanization, hence, 
implied not just the growth of cities, but an "increased 
involvement of the members of rural communities in sets of 
activities, norms, and social relationships thatreach beyond the 
limits of their own localities.~ll 
Tilly argued that the crucial difference between the Mauges 
and the Val-Saumurois was the extent and the recentness of their 
urbanization. The Val-Saumurois was "thoroughly and evenly 
urbanized;" even its rural inhabitants had long lived in sizeable 
agglomerated villages and sold their produce in regional and 
national markets.12 This thorough and even urbanization made the 
Val-Samurois well adapted to the more rational and centralized 
bourgeois regime introduced by the Revolution. The Mauges, by 
contrast, was much less urbanized, but it had experienced very 
rapid urbanization -- especially in the form of rural textile 
manufacturing -- in recent decades. This recent but incomplete 
urbanization made the social organization of the Mauges far less 
uniform and led to intense confrontations when the Revolution 
shifted power to the urban bourgeoisie and its agents in the 
countryside. 
Tillyfs analysis of how the different forms of social 
organization of these two regions led to different political and 
social experiences in the'revolution is superb. But his 
sociological interpretation of these differences is marred by a 
gratuitous introduction of teleological temporality. For Tilly, 
the Mauge and the Val-Saumurois represent different points on a 
single developmental continuum from less to more urbanized. His 
procedure, as he puts it, is one "of comparing communities at 
roughly the same point in time as if they were at different 
stages in a progression from a common origin."l3 The obvious 
advantage of this procedure is its generality; it means that 
differences found between two regions are not just a local 
peculiarity, but are comparable to differences in level of 
urbanization in other places and times. Introducing a single 
continuum makes it possible to envisage this local study as one 
contribution to a general scientific sociological account of the 
effects of urbanization on politics. 
The problem is that the difference between the social 
organization of the Val-Saumurois and that of the Mauges 
demonstrably is not a matter of different stages in a single 
master process. The contrasting forms of social organization 
that Tilly attributes to differences in a progressive development ' 
-- large nucleated villages surrounded by open fields in the Val- 
Saumurois as against more isolated small villages and hamlets 
scattered over hedged fields in the Mauges -- were actually 
constant and virtually unchanging features of the rural 
environment. The line dividing the Val-Saumurois from the Mauges 
was an ancient territorial division between what Marc Bloch 
characterized as distinct "agrarian civilizationsm whose 
characteristics were already in place by the early Middle Ages.14 
Tilly, in short, committed the fallacy of transmuting a fixed 
socio-geographical difference in social organization into 
putative stages in the linear development of the abstract master 
process of urbanization. 
Tillyts use of urbanization as a linear teleology did not 
actually spoil his comparative study of the political effects of 
regional social structures, but it did misrepresent the book's 
contribution -- by casting its subject as a local instance of a 
universal social process. By doing so, it left unvoiced what I 
regard as the book's most original accomplishment: its acute 
analysis of how variations in local social structures made 
possible a smooth transition from old regime to revolutionary 
government in the Val-Saumurois, but enabled the French 
Revolution to reconfigure and give new meaning to existing social 
networks and social cleavages in the Mauges, touching off an 
escalating and unpredictable chain of confrontational events that 
culminated in a massive and durable shift in collective 
identities. It hid a masterwork of evenemential sociology behind 
a veil of misconstrued universalizing science. 
One might object that The Vendee was Tillyts first book and 
that his mature work avoids these youthful errors. After all, he 
subsequently abandoned his overly abstract concept of 
urbanization, breaking it down into the two more specific notions 
of state centralization and capitalist development. But in his 
long and evolving project on French collective violence, which he 
took up after finishing The Vendee, he essentially retained that 
book's teleological fascination with underlying master processes, 
while abandoning its superb but insufficiently voiced 
evenemential analysis. Charmed by his own universalizing 
rhetoric, he pursued the notion that acts of political 
contestation arise from gradual evolutionary changes in large and 
anonymous social processes -- rather than the alternative theme 
that changes in political regimes reconfigure and give new 
meaning to existing social networks and cleavages, thereby 
creating new collective identities. 
Tilly argues in his various books and articles on collective 
violence that the change in forms of violence over the past three 
centuries -- in brief, a change from "reactive," backward- 
looking, locally oriented to llproactive,N forward-looking, and 
nationally oriented violence -- was the consequence of the 
gradual and inexorable rise of state centralization and 
capitalism.15 Such an'argument is not necessarily teleological. 
Teleology is not impl-ied, for example, when Tilly argues that 
change in the targets and goals of violent protest arise in part 
from the particular and changing nature of the state presence in 
localities. But the argument frequently takes on a teleological 
quality, largely because the asserted causes -- capitalist 
development and state centralization -- occur off stage, outside 
of Tillyfs texts, where they are essentially assumed as ever- 
present and ever-rising forces, a kind of eternal yeast.16 The 
violent incidents that Tilly describes in great number thus 
figure only as consequences of invisible causes; they are not 
events in the full sense because they are only effects, never 
causes, of change. A particularly clear indication that Tilly 
has abandoned evenemential analysis in his more recent work is 
his denial that even the historianst mega-event, the French 
Revolution, significantly transformed the nature of collective 
violence: in his account, it merely caused a certain acceleration 
of already existing trends.17 Thus, in spite of the inspired 
evenemential analysis contained in The Vendee, the dominant 
rhetoric of Tilly's work has not broken with a teleological 
conceptualization of temporality. 
Theda Skocpol and Experimental Temporality 
If Wallerstein and Tilly exemplify the continuing grip of 
teleological temporality in historical sociology, Theda Skocpol 
is the leading prophet-and exemplar of experimental temporality. 
In States and- Social Revolutions, Skocpol. explicitly embraces the 
standard "scientificvv methodology of mainstream American 
.sociology, extending it to historical studies. "Comparative 
historical analysis," she asserts, 
is distinctively appropriate for developing explanations of 
macro-historical phenomena of which there are inherently 
only a few cases.  his-is‘in contrast to more plentiful and 
manipulable kinds of phenomena suitable for experimental 
investigations, and in contrast to other phenomena where 
there are the large numbers of cases required for 
statistical analyses. Comparative historical analysis is, 
in fact, the mode of multivariate analysis to which one 
resorts when there are too many variables and not enough 
cases. 18 
~kocpol applies her comparative method to the three great 
social revolutions of modern times -- the French, the Russian, 
and the Chinese. Her analysis attempts to set up comparative 
"natural experimentstv capable of sorting out the 'causal factors 
that explain the occurrence of social revolutions. She explores 
the histories of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, 
but also of two major political crises that never became 
revolutions (the Prussian Reform Movement of 1807-1814 and the 
Japanese Meji Restoration of 1868-73) and of two political 
revolutions that did not become social revolutions (the English 
Civil War and Glorious Revolution of 1640-1688 and the German 
Revolution of 1848-50). On the basis of her comparative 
investigation of these seven cases, Skocpol develops a powerful 
and sophistocated theory of the causes of social revolutions. 
She begins by noting that the pre-revolutionary French, Russian, 
and Chinese states had all fallen behind their rivals in military 
competition. This gave rise to attempts to catch up by 
instituting far reaching administrative, economic, and fiscal 
reforms. But these reforms were resisted in all three states by 
the dominant landlord class -- which had a firm enough foothold 
in the state to block, slow, or subvert the reforms. The 
consequence was a deep fiscal and political crisis that was 
broken only by a revolution. These considerations led Skocpol to 
posit two conditions for social revolution: the existence of a 
state that fell behind rival states in military competition and a 
dominant class of landlords who were sufficiently powerful to 
block state-initiated reforms. She strengthens this 
specification of causes by examining the Prussian and Japanese 
cases. In both cases the states were driven into crisis by 
failure in military competition, but because the Prussian and 
Japanese dominant classes had little political leverage against 
the state, reformers from within the state apparatus managed to 
revitalize the states without the intervention of political 
revolution. 
But Skocpol also finds another necessary condition for the 
occurrence of social revolutions. Fiscal crises based on 
military backwardness and exacerbated by the resistance of 
recalcitrant landlords may have been enough to touch off 
political revolutions, but for these to become social revolutions -- that is, to bring about a transformation of the country's 
class structure -- something more was required: a massive 
uprising of the peasant class. Social revolutions, therefore, 
also required the existence of well-organized and autonomous 
peasant communities capable of taking advantage of the breakdown 
of state authority in a political revolution. Once again, 
Skocpol shows how this condition was present in her three cases 
but absent in the seventeenth-century English and mid-nineteenth- 
century German revolutions, which never advanced from political 
to social revolutions. In short, Skocpol uses a quasi- 
experimental, inductive method to discover the three factors 
necessary for social revolutions: (1) milctary backwardness, (2) 
politically powerful landlord classes, and (3) autonomous peasant 
communities. As I understand the argument, these factors are 
conceptualized as seauenced: factor one induces a political 
crisis; the addition of factor two turns the political crisis 
into a political revolution; and the further addition of factor 
three turns the political revolution into a social revolution. 
The explanation Skocpol develops by considering these seven 
cases is extremely powerful and, quibbling aside, quite 
convincing. But the,power of her explanation cannot derive, as 
Skocpol claims, from her application of quasi-experimental 
inductive method. As Michael Burawoy has pointed out in a recent 
article, a careful examination of Skocpol's logic and evidence 
indicates that her explanation is by no means proven by the 
"natural experiments" carried out in her book.19 In fact, her 
evidence fails in more than one way. First, as Burawoy remarks, 
the seventeenth-century English and mid-nineteenth-century German 
cases actually seem to refute the first stage of her causal 
theory, since they were genuine political revolutions that were 
not provoked by military failures: the English revolution of 1640 
certainly arose out of a fiscal crisis, but not a fiscal crisis 
that was provoked by military reverses, and the German revolution 
of March 1848 was provoked by neither military reverses nor 
fiscal crisis. Skocpolts comparisons actually demonstrate that 
far-reaching political revolutions may arise in the absence of 
both of her first two factors.20 
Second, the array of cases compared by Skocpol does not 
demonstrate that the full sequence of three factors is necessary 
to produce a social revolution. To do so, Skocpol would have had 
to find a case in which military failure and landlord resistance 
led to political revolution, but in which a social revolution 
failed to develop due to the absence of autonomous peasant 
communities. But she has no such case: the Meji Restoration and 
the Prussian Reform Movement had only the first factor, the 
English Revolution only the second, and the German Revolution of 
1848 none of the three. On the .basis of Skocpol's evidence, it 
remains logically possible that a combination of military 
backwardness and a powerful landlord class was by itself 
sufficient to produce a social revolution. 
Indeed, Skocpol's analysis of the Chinese Revolution could 
actually be read as supporting this proposition. There a social 
revolution took place in a country where only the,first two of 
Skocpol's conditions were initially present. Skocpol treats the 
case as confirming her theory. As she tells the story, the 
peasantry's lack of autonomy from landlords long prevented the 
poLitica1 revolution initiated in 1911-from becoming a social 
revolution. It was only after 1940 that the Chinese Communists 
orsanized an autonomous peasantry in the districts they 
controlled,.thereby creating the agrarian striking force 
necessary to carry through a social revolution.21 But this 
argument is actually highly -ambiguous. One could just as easily 
say that the long standoff between state and landlords, 
exacerbated by the Japanese invasion in 1935, created the 
conditions for a successful social revolution in the areas which 
the Koumintang could no longer control. .The creation of peasant 
communities autonomous from landlords was, in this telling, less 
a precondition for social revolution than a conseauence of a 
locally successful Communist-led social revolution touched off by 
a collapse of the stalemated state in the wake of military 
failure. 
These two flaws in Skocpolts argument invalidate her claim 
to have confirmed empirically her theory of social revolutions. 
She has not shown either that political revolutions are explained 
by a combination of military reverses and effective landlord 
resistance to reforms or that autonomous peasant communities are 
necessary for a political revolution to be transformed into a 
social revolution. It is true that these flaws are not intrinsic 
to the comparative method per se; Skocpol is working on such a 
rare phenomenon that she has been unable to amass an array of 
cases sufficient to test out all the logical possibilities 
inherent in her theory. It is, perhaps, embarrassing that she 
jumped to conclusions unwarranted by a strict evaluation of the 
comparative evidence, but it is hardly fatal for the method she 
espouses. A historical sociologist working on a somewhat more 
common phenomenon could surely devise more adequate empirical 
tests.22 Of course, limiting ourselves to more tractable 
phenomena would save the comparative method only at a very high 
cost, inasmuch as it would restrict sociologyfs ability to say 
anything valid about rare but world-shaping events like social 
revolutions. At best, the evidence and arguments presented in 
States and Social Revolutions hardly justifies Skocpolfs 
confidence that comparative historical analysis is a panacea for 
sociologists working on problems where I1there are too many 
variables and not enough cases."23 
Nor do Skocpolfs logical difficulties end here. The most 
troubling flaws of quasi-experimental comparative method come not 
from the difficulty of amassing enough cases, which affects only 
some research problems, but from the unhistorical assumptions 
about temporality that strict adherence to experimental logic 
requires. The experimental conception of temporality, I shall 
argue, is inseparable from conventional comparative method, and 
it can be imposed only by what Burawoy aptly dubs "freezing 
historym -- and, I would extend the metaphor, by fracturing the 
congealed block of historical time into artificially 
interchangeable units. 
In order for Skocpolfs revolutions to be subjected to her 
comparative method, they must be conceptualized as analogous to 
separate "trialso of an experiment. This means that the trials 
must be both eauivalent and inde~endent. The principle of 
equivalence implies that each new trial (in this case, new 
revolution) must be a genuine replication of earlier trials, with 
all relevant variables held constant.  his implies definite 
assumptions about temporality. The relevant temporality in 
experimental logic is purely internal to the trial: the posited 
causal factors must exist prior to their posited consequence. By 
contrast, the external temporality of historical time -- whether 
one trial precedes or follows another and by how much -- must, by 
definition, be considered irrelevant in order to meet the 
requirement that experimental trials be strictly equivalent. 
This requirement that trials be equivalent poses 
considerable difficulty for Skocpolfs arguments about the causes 
of social revolutions. In order to use inductive comparison, 
Skocpol must assume that her three great social revolutions are 
.in fact a uniform class of objects governed by identical causal 
laws. But this is a highly dubious assumption, in part because 
new classes and new class relations arise over time. This, in 
turn, might well alter the conditions necessary and sufficient 
for social revolution. To take a pertinent example, the 
industrial revolution intervened between the French   evolution 
and the Russian Revolution, giving rise to a new industrial 
proletariat. One might consequently assert, with some 
plausibility, that the revolt of the Petersburg and Moscow 
proletariat was a necessary condition for social revolution in 
Russia in 1917, even if it was not a condition in France in 1789. 
But, as Burawoy points out, Skocpol cannot consider this 
possibility without breaking the crucial assumption of 
equivalence between the revolutions. Thus, instead of examining 
empirical evidence about the role of the industrial proletariat 
in Russia, she dismisses the possibility out of hand on the 
grounds that because a proletarian revolt was not necessary in 
her other two cases it cannot have been in Russia either.24 The 
assumption of equivalence, which is a logical foundation of 
Skocpol's comparative method, does not allow her to pursue 
questions about how events intervening between revolutions might 
affect their occurrence and outcome.25 
The second fundamental assumption of experimental logic, 
that experimental trials must be independent of one another, also 
poses serious problems for Skocpol's analysis. For trials to be 
independent, the outcome of any given trial must have no effect 
on the outcome of a subsequent tria1.26 But it is absurd to 
assume that earlier revolutions had no influence on later 
revolutions. After all, the leadership of the Bolshevik party 
self-consciously patterned its own revolutionary efforts on what 
it regarded as the lessons of the French Revolution, and the 
.Chinese Communists not only modelled themselves explicitly on the 
Bolsheviks but received direct aid from them. Once again, this 
assumption can only be sustained by "freezingn and "fracturingg1 
history, by treating the histories of the three revolutions as if 
they took place in isolation from one another rather than as a 
sequence of historically connected events. In short, Skocpol's 
comparisons are fundamentally logically deficient if viewed from 
the perspective of experimental method. They fail both the 
requirement of equivalence and the requirement of independence. 
Although it may occasionally be possible to identify a 
universe of historical objects that simultaneously satisfies the 
assumptions of equivalence and independence, such occasions are 
likely to be unusual. With rare exceptions, attempts to assure 
equivalence in historical cases will actually result in 
decreasing the independence between cases -- and vice versa. The 
obvious way to assure independence is to compare phenomena that 
are widely separated in space and time; one can be reasonably 
sure, for example, that similarities between royal ceremonies in 
eighteenth-century Japan and ancient Mesopotamia cannot be 
accounted for by imitation. But the very remoteness that assures 
independence makes the assumption of equivalence impossible to 
sustain: in societies with radically different economies, systems 
of social stratification, religious beliefs, conceptions of 
gender, and so on, how could we ever be confident that the 
relevant differences have been controlled for? 
It was for precisely this reason that Marc Bloch, in his 
seminal article on comparative history, cautioned against 
studying "societies so widely separated in time and space that 
any analogies observed between them.,.can obviously not be 
explained either by mutual influence or by a common origin."27 
Bloch believed that such comparisons were too imprecise and 
therefore opted for 
a parallel study of societies that are at once neighboring 
and contemporary, exercising a constant mutual influence, 
exposed throughout their development to the action of the 
same broad causes, and owing their existence in part to a 
common origin. 
Bloch preferred comparisons of neighboring societies essentially 
on the-grounds that- in such societies the assumption of 
equivalence could reasonably be approximated.28 I suspect that 
Bloch, as usual, made the wiser choice. But his choice obviously 
moves comparative history farther from the no less logically 
necessary assumption of independence between the cases; because 
the societies Bloch studied exercised a "constant mutual 
influencew on one another, it is in principle impossible to 
determine whether a similar outcome in two cases resulted from a 
posited set of causal factors or from the play of influence. 
With rare exceptions, equivalence between historical cases is 
bought only at the price of decreasing independence. This 
paradox, I submit, makes history a singularly unpromising 
territory for the kind of rigorous experimental induction that 
Skocpol advocates, but cannot really practice, in States and 
Social Revolutions. 
It is remarkable, in view of the logical and empirical 
failure of Skocpolts program of experimental induction, that her 
analysis of social revolutions remains so powerful and 
convincing. This implies that, as was true of both Wallerstein 
and Tilly as well, something important and valuable is 
accomplished in the book that remains unvoiced in its explicit 
theoretical and methodological statements.29 I would contend 
that much of this unvoiced work occurs in her handling of events. 
The bulk of her book is composed not of a rigorous weighing of 
comparative evidence, but of carefully constructed causal 
narratives specifying how social revolutions are brought about in 
her three cases, Skocpolfs best statement of her narrative 
strategy is, symptomatically, tucked away in a footnote, where 
she complains that "social-scientific analyses of revolutions 
almost never ...g ive sufficient analytic weight to the 
conjunctural, unfolding interactions of originally separately 
determined pr0cesses.~30 
Specifying the wconjunctural, unfolding interactions of 
originally separately determined processestW is the distinctive 
narrative strategy of her book. It is distinct not only from the 
usual strategy of sociologists, but from the usual strategy of 
historians as well. Sociological analyses of revolutions tend to 
emphasize the primacy of some single cause of revolutions, 
systematically subordinating other causes to the chosen 
explanatory factor-; historical analyses typically attempt to 
recount the course of a revolution in some semblance of its 
original complexity, discussing different causa.1 features of the 
revolutionary process only as they make themselves felt in the 
unfolding of the story. The problem with the historical strategy 
is that crucial causal processes tend to get lost in a muddle of 
narrative detail and are never separated out enough to make their 
autonomous dynamics clear. The trouble with the sociological 
strategy is that although it successfully specifies the causal 
dynamics of one factor, it tends either to conflate other causal 
factors with the chosen cause (as Marxian treatments of 
revolution have often viewed the state as merely an expression of 
class power) or to treat them as mere background (as most studies' 
of revolution have done with the international military setting). 
Skocpolfs strategy is an inspired compromise. It appropriates 
the power of the sociological strategy, but applies it to not one 
but several distinct causal processes. Yet by emphasizing 
ltconjunctural, unfolding interactionslw it also appropriates the 
historical strategy's concern with events, sequence, and 
contingency. Quite apart from considerations of comparative 
experimental induction, Skocpol has elaborated in States and 
Social Revolutions an extremely effective strategy for what might 
be,dubbed multiple causal narrative.31 She has, to put it 
otherwise, worked out a kind of incipient theory of revolutionary 
process, of how events, by straining or rearranging structures, 
open the door to further transformative events. But this 
significant rhetorical and theoretical innovation is never 
signaled in her introduction or conclusion, and is only 
formulated in passing in a footnote in the third chapter. 
Skocpol's misplaced obsession with quasi-experimental comparative 
met_hod has virtually obscured her highly original contribution to 
evenemential sociology. 
Skocpol's formal comparative method, with its experimental 
conception of temporality, makes little contribution to her 
innovations in evenemential sociology. Nevertheless, I believe 
that serious comparative thinking played a crucial role in 
developing her incipient theory of revolutionary process. The 
formal logic of comparative method has been developed exclusively 
as a means of assessing the empirical accuracy of theoretical 
propositions -- to deal with the phase of scientific research 
that Lacatos has termed the "context of justification."32 I 
suspect, however, that the most important role of comparison in 
States and Social Revolutions was actually in the Itcontext of 
discoveryM -- that phase of research concerned with generating 
theoretical ideas. Skocpol's own description of the history of 
her project suggests as much. She began, she tells us, with the 
history of the Chinese revolution, then found that the Chinese 
developments suggested unsuspected analogies with the French 
case, and finally used an analytic scheme worked out from the 
Chinese and French cases to interpret Russian history.33 One 
suspects that this mutual reading of each of the cases in terms 
of the others continued and kept spiraling back: that, for 
example, Trotsky's emphasis on backward Russia's unsuccessful 
military competition with the European powers must have suggested 
parallels in the crisis of the French old regime, or that Georges 
Lefebvrets analyses of the crucial contribution of aristocratic 
resistance and peasant revolts to the French Revolution must have 
thrown a sharp light on the roles of landlords and peasants in 
Russia and China.34 
I suspect that Skocpol formulated and deepened her 
interpretations of key revolutionary events by just such a 
process of critically extending causal narratives from each of 
the cases to each of the others. A rough causal logic certainly 
guided such analogical extensions: if attempts to reform the 
sprawling agrarian state of Imperial Russia arose in response to 
the threat of German military prowess, is it not likely that 
comparable attempts to reform a roughly similar French state 
might have arisen from repeated defeats at the hands of England? 
But Skocpolts presentation of comparative method as a means of 
testing already formulated general propositions gets it the wrong 
way around. It might be more accurate to say that comparison 
generated propositions whose potential generality was tested by 
their ability to illuminate the conjunctural unfolding of causal 
processes-in each of the particular cases. Deep analogies about 
evenemential sequences, rather than rigorous experimental tests 
of abstract generalizations, may be the true payoff of Skocpolts 
comparative history. 
Evenemential Temporality 
The evenemential conception of temporality may be defined in 
contrast to the experimental and teleological conceptions. The 
experimental conception rests on two fundamental assumptions: a 
uniformity of causal laws across time and a causal independence 
of every sequence of occurrences from previous and subsequent 
occurrences. The evenemential conception of temporality denies 
both of these assumptions. Rather than assuming causal 
independence through time, it assumes that events are normally 
@@path dependent," that is, that what has happened at an earlier 
point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of 
events occurring at a later point in time. However, path 
dependence does not necessarily imply that causal laws change 
over time. In fact, the notion of path dependence was initially 
formalized by economists who argued that different but equally 
rational choices among alternative technologies at one point in 
time would imply a divergence in choices at later times even 
under the standard economistst causal assumption that all actors 
at all points in time pursue their advantage rationally. 
A fully evenemential conception of causality must also deny 
the assumption that causal laws are uniform through time. Events 
must be assumed to be capable of changing not only the balance of 
causal forces operating but the very logic by which consequences 
follow from occurrences or circumstances. A fully evenemential 
account of the fate of nobles in the French Revolution, for 
example, would have to argue that nobles lost power not only 
because the loss of some of their assets -- land, tax privileges, 
feudal dues, offices -- reduced their resources relative to those 
of other classes, .but also because the rules of the social and 
political game were radically redefined, making what had 
previously been a-prime asset -- their noble status -- into a 
powerful liability by the time of the Terror. In this case, and 
I would argue in general, events bring about historical changes 
in part by transforming the very cultural categories that shape 
and constrain human action. Since the causalities that operate 
in social relations depend at least in part on the contents and 
relations of cultural categories, events have the power to 
transform social causality.35 
An evenemential concept of temporality, then, assumes a 
causal dependence of later occurrences on prior occurrences and 
assumes that social causality is temporally heterogeneous, not 
temporally uniform. Evenemential temporality therefore differs 
fundamentally from experimental temporality. It also differs 
from teleological temporality. Teleological and evenemential 
temporality share an assumption of path dependence, but 
teleological temporality denies temporal heterogeneity, or at 
least general temporal heterogeneity. (Stage theories, one of 
the-subtypes of teleological theories, assume causal homogeneity 
within stages, but may accept radical heterogeneity between 
stages.) However, teleological and evenemential concepts of 
temporality differ most sharply on the question of contingency. 
Teleological temporality is compatible with a certain contingency 
at the surface of social relations, but it is incompatible with 
the assumption of radical contingency that I regard as 
fundamental to evenemential temporality. For example, a 
teleological Marxian account might argue that the particular 
situation in which a conflict between workers and bourgeois 
occurs may affect the outcome of their struggle and may even 
result in a local victory for a retrograde form of social 
organization -- say for artisanal over factory production. But 
no combination of such local victories can Itturn back the clocktt 
definitively. The built-in directionality of underlying causal 
forces guarantees that local variations are mere surface 
perturbations with no long-term effect on the course of history. 
By contrast, an evenemential concept of temporality assumes that 
contingency is global, that it characterizes not only the surface 
but the core or the depths of social relations. Contingent, 
unexpected, and inherently unpredictable events, this view 
assumes, can undo or alter the most apparently durable trends of 
history. This does not, of course, imply that human societies 
are in permanent and universal flux, that social change is easy 
to accomplish, or that historical changes display no 
regularities. I am not arguing that capitalism or the global 
division of labor or sexual inequality would go away if only we 
wished it, or that history is a tale told by an idiot. History 
displays both stubborn durabilities and sudden breaks, and even 
the most radical historical ruptures are interlaced with 
remarkable continuities. An assumption of global contingency 
means not that everything is constantly changing, but that 
nothing in social life is ultimately immune to change. 
The evenemential conception of temporality, then, assumes 
that social relations are characterized by path dependency, 
temporally heterogeneous causalities, and global contingency. 
This is close to the implicit intellectual baggage of most 
academic historians, and it would not be hard to find works by 
historians that incorporate an evenemential approach to 
temporality. Yet most historians take the effectivity of events 
so much for granted that their accounts of events tend to lack a 
theoretical edge. Marshall Sahlins, citing Ruth Benedict's 
aphorism that if deep sea fish could speak the last thing they 
would name is water, points out that historians "live in the 
narrative elementw and consequently are remarkably 
unselfconscious about the event as a theoretical category.36 By 
contrast, those few sociologists who argue for the significance 
of events tend to do so with particular clarity and force -- 
thanks both to their highly developed methodological 
consciousness and to their need to convince antievenemential 
sceptics in their profession. I will try to demonstrate the 
promise of evenemential sociology by analyzing works by two 
sociologists: Mark Traugott and Howard Kimeldorf.37 
Traugottfs Organizational Hypothesis 
Traugottfs book may be characterized as a study of the 
differential effect of a great event, the French Revolution of 
1848, on two groups of French workers: those enrolled in the 
government's unemployment relief organization, the National 
Workshops, who formed the core of the great workers' revolt of 
June 1848, and those recruited into the paramilitary Mobile 
Guard, who were instrumental in suppressing it. Traugott's task 
is to explain why workers associated with these two organizations 
wound up on opposite sides of the barricades. The leading 
explanation of their divergent political trajectories has been 
Marx's. Marx claimed that the Mobile Guard had no scruples about 
shooting down the proletarian insurrectionaries because it had 
been recruited exclusively from the rootless lum~en-~roletariat, 
the scum of the urban poor. Traugott spends much of his book -- 
and doubtless spent even more of his research time -- subjecting 
this argument to a painstaking quantitative test, which shows 
that the pre-February occupations of the June rebels and the 
Guardsmen were in fact virtually identical.38 The divergent 
political behavior of Guards and Workshop members cannot be 
explained by differences in their class backgrounds. 
The failure of this standard sociological explanation led 
Traugott to what he calls the "organizational hypothesis" -- that 
the divergent actions of guardsmen and insurrectionaries were the 
result not of characteristics of their pre-1848 lives but of 
their collective experiences between February and June 1848.39 
Traugott tests this hypothesis by means of a "paired comparisontt 
of the organizational histories of the Mobile ~ u a r d  and the 
National Wo.rkshops. There are many parallels between the two 
institutions: both were improvised in response to, working-class 
pressures after the February Revolution, and both were intended 
by the Provisional Government simultaneously as a means of 
alleviating unemployment and of coopting potentially rebellious 
workers to moderate their political sentiments.40 Moreover, both 
institutions were deeply mistrusted by the conservative 
bourgeoisie, which feared they would become hotbeds of socialist 
agitation. By means of his paired comparison, Traugott shows 
that both were initially highly successful cooptive institutions, 
and that the National Workshops became a nursery of rebellion 
only when they were organizationally decapitated by a hostile 
government. 
Traugottts organizational analysis borrows from Katherine 
Chorleyts Armies and the Art of Revolution.41 By April of 1848 
the initially rag tag Mobile Guard had met Chorleyts three 
crucial conditions for successful military repression of a 
revolutionary movement: a unified corps of officers, effective 
isolation from the civilian population, and prompt attention to 
practical grievances in the ranks. The Mobile Guardst officer 
corps was supplied by the regular army, supplemented by carefully 
managed elections from the ranks; by April it became a highly 
professional and unified body. The guardsmen were isolated from 
the civilian population because they were housed in barracks, 
usually not in their own neighborhoods. One practical grievance -- a long delay in the provision of uniforms -- seriously 
threatened to undermine the guardsmen's morale, but it was 
resolved well before June. Hence the potentially unruly Mobile 
Guard was moulded into a disciplined military force that was 
willing to face down fellow workers in several confrontations in 
April and May, and to shoot them down when the insurrection broke 
out in June.42 
Although the National Workshops were not a military force, 
Traugott uses Chorleyts model in his analysis of their 
organizational history as well. The Workshops were actually 
organized on a military model -- with squads, brigades, and 
companies and a uniformed officer corps. mile Thomas, the 
youthful director of the workshops, assured the unity of his 
officer corps by recruiting its upper echelons from students at a 
national engineering school of which he was an alumnus. Lower 
level officers were chosen by election from the ranks, but 
subjected to close administrative supervision. The unified 
officer corps not only enabled Thomas to maintain firm 
administrative control of the Workshops, but contributed to his 
personal popularity in the ranks. Thomas was less successful in 
his efforts to overcome practical grievances -- mainly because 
the Workshops were never supplied with enough meaningful work to 
occupy their full contingent of unemployed laborers (about 
120,000 by June). Nor could members of the Workshops be fully 
separated from the general population -- they made up about a 
third of the working class of Paris and continued to live in 
their own neighborhoods. But Thomas did his best, insisting that 
members report to their brigades every day, whether they had work 
or not, and posting them to peripheral locations when there were 
demonstrations or political troubles. He also established a 
National Workshops political club, attempting with considerable 
success to isolate workshop members from the political clubs of 
their neighborhoods.43 
This surprisingly effective isolation, together with the 
unity of the officer corps and Thomas1 personal popularity, 
assured the Workshops1 political moderation until nearly the end 
of May -- and might have done so indefinitely had the government 
not decided to sack Thomas and phase out the Workshops. This 
drove the elected squad and brigade leaders to the left, released 
them from the political and organizational tutelage of Thomas and 
his loyal school-mates, and transformed them from conduits of 
moderation to a revolutionary cadre.44 When the full destruction 
of the Workshops was announced on June 21, they led their squads 
and brigades in armed revolt. In short, members of the National 
Workshops and the Mobile Guard took opposite sides in June not 
because of divergent class backgrounds but because of the 
divergent organizational histories of the two institutions. The 
ttorganizational hypothesisw best explains the observed behavior. 
We should be clear, however, that Traugottls organizational 
hypothesis is not just another sociological hypothesis. He is 
advocating not merely that we consider another explanatory factor 
parallel to class background, income, religious preference, or 
cohort, but that we entertain a new and essentially evenemential 
form of explanatory argument. The organizational explanation of 
why the National Workshops rebelled and the Mobile Guard put down 
the rebellion is in fact a causal narrative of how these 
institutions were shaped through time, and it has a 
characteristically evenemential temporality. It incorporates 
path dependency: the timing of incidents crucially affects their 
consequences. The fact that the Mobile Guard's deeply felt 
grievance about lack of uniforms had been rectified well before 
June assured the Guard's loyalty to the government; had a revolt 
broken out before the resolution of this grievance it is 
uncertain whether the Guard would have followed orders to march 
against fellow workers. Traugottls temporality is also causally 
heterogeneous. Consider the role of the Workshops' squad and 
brigade leaders, who formed the leadership cadre of the 
insurrection. Their positions of leadership were produced by 
Emile Thomas1 paternalist strategy of cultivating their personal 
and political loyalties and integrating them tightly into the 
Workshops1 officer corps. This paternalism had the intended 
effects of assuring the moderation of the Workshop members as 
long as Thomas and his schoolmates ran organization. But when 
Thomas was sacked, the squad and brigade leaders were also in 
position to organize the rank and file's resistance to the 
closing of the Workshops, by armed revolt if necessary. 
Paradoxically, the organizational structure erected by Thomas to 
insure the workers1 moderation had the effect of exacerbating the 
crisis when it came. In brief, the creation of this working 
class organizational infrastructure changed the causal dynamics 
of the situation, greatly amplifying the extent, intensity, and 
effectiveness of resistance to the government's closing of the 
Workshops. 
It should be clear that the temporality of Traugottfs 
account is interlaced with contingency. Like classical narrative 
historians, Traugott emphasizes the importance of significant 
persons. The Workshops were organized as they were largely 
because of the personal decisions of Emile Thomas, and his 
removal from the directorship was a decisive cause of their 
radicalization. A forceful and magnetic person like Thomas, 
placed in a position of strategic importance, can have a 
remarkable effect on the course of history. Conscious choice 
also figures importantly in Traugottfs account. Thomas 
purposefully drew his officer corps from his schoolmates so as to 
enhance its solidarity. The conservative government purposefully 
provoked a crisis by abolishing the Workshops. For all these 
reasons, the course of the events Traugott analyzes is 
contingent, not necessary. Had the government maintained the 
Workshops in existence and kept Thomas as their director, the 
insurrection might never have happened. Had someone less capable 
been chosen as director, the revolt would probably have been less 
effective, but it might well have happened considerably earlier. 
Traugott's embrace of evenemential temporality does not mean 
. that he has abandoned sociology for narrative history. He is 
driven to evenemential explanation by the austere logic of his 
sociological method, and he carefully specifies the structural 
limits within which timing, personality, choice, and contingency 
operate. Although he comes down in this case for evenemential 
rather than etiological explanations, he does so not to dismiss 
etiological factors, but to specify their mode of effectuation. 
Class, as he points out, may have an influence, but "any class- 
based propensities of actors are conditioned by a set of 
contingent organizational f0rces.~~45 He is arguing not that 
history is a sequence of pure contingencies, but that "an 
intervening [I would add evenemential] level of analysis must 
demonstrate by what mechanisms macrosociological structures are 
converted into forms of consciousness and the probability of 
collective action.I146 Traugott's book, with its careful 
methodology and its focus on the relationship between structures 
and events, points the way toward an evenemential sociology that 
remains an evenemential sociolocrv. 
Kimeldorffs Multiple Registers of Causation 
Kimeldorffs book is a study of the divergent political 
evolution of longshoremenfs unions in New York City and on the 
West Coast from.the 1930s through the 1950s. Kimeldorf, like 
Traugott, uses a strategy of paired comparison, combines 
narrative history with structural analysis, and provides powerful 
arguments for the significance of events in the shaping of 
workersf politics. Kimeldorf attempts to explain why East Coast 
and West Coast dockworkers, who did similar work under similar 
technological and economic conditions, nevertheless formed 
sharply contrasting labor unions -- the durably socialist 
International Longshorements and Warehousemenfs Union (ILWU) on 
the West Coast and the politically conservative and chronically 
racket-ridden International Longshorements Association (ILA) on 
the East Cost. 
Kimeldorf8s explanation of the difference between the New 
York and West Coast longshore unions is complex, multicausal, and 
irreducibly historical. He shows that the differences cannot be 
attributed to any single, underlying factor, and have historical 
roots that go back well before the 1930s. The explanatory 
factors are of several different types. First the recruitment 
and the cultures of the labor forces differed substantially. A 
high proportion of the West Coast longshoremen were recruited 
from the lumbering and seafaring industries, which because of 
their work structures very commonly give rise to high levels of 
worker solidarity and class conflict, and certainly did so on the 
American West Coast in the early twentieth century. This labor 
force, whose prior work experience already inclined it to labor 
militancy, was widely but only temporarily organized by the 
radical IWW in the teens and twenties. By the 1930s West Coast 
dockworkers already had been exposed to a radical work culture 
that made them ready to heed Harry Bridgesf ca11.47 These 
predisposing factors were entirely absent among the New York 
dockworkers, where the labor force was recruited from two 
successive peasant immigrant groups, the Irish and Italians, who, 
by the 1930s, had established ethnically divided enclaves on the 
docks. Moreover, the political and work culture was far more 
conservative -- dominated by the Catholic Church in the case of 
the Irish and by an exploitative (sometimes Mafia-ridden) padrone 
system in that of the Italians.48 
These differences in labor recruitment were reinforced by 
differences in the structure and consequently in the class 
capacities of shipping capitalists. On the West Coast three 
American companies dominated the carrying trade and were 
consequently able to carry on a particularly ferocious and 
ultimately radicalizing battle against longshore unions; in New 
York the carrying trade was divided between a larger number of 
American and European companies and a large government-owned 
line. This divided employer class was unable to sustain a 
unified front against longshore unions and the companies 
therefore negotiated separate deals with different union 
locals.49 There were, hence, structural factors of demographic, 
cultural, and economic natures that made radical unionism more 
likely on the West Coast than in New York. 
But while these structural factors might have been 
sufficient to rule out radical unionism on the New York docks, 
they were hardly sufficient to guarantee it on the West Coast. 
In a chapter entitled "The strategic Pivot," Kimeldorf moves from 
relatively stable structural conditions to more contingent 
conjunctural and volitional causes. The conjuncture, largely 
shared by the two coasts, was the depression and the new 
political climate and nationwide labor militancy it engendered. 
But the radical potential of this period was seized successfully 
on the West Coast and missed in New York largely because of the 
very different strategies of the two areas, Communist Parties. 
In San Francisco, which became the center of radical longshore 
unionism, the local Communists ignored the national party's 
strategy of supporting separate left-wing unions, opting to 
develop a leftist force within the existing moderate union 
instead. The consequence was that the Communists and allied 
left-wingers such as Bridges were in a position to assume 
leadership in the dramatic and violent strike of 1834 and move 
the rank and file definitively to the left.50 By contrast, the 
New York party stuck obstinately to an utterly unsuccessful 
policy of separate left unionism and was thereby deprived of any 
chance to play a radicalizing role in the New York strike 
movements of the same year.51 Finally, the dramatic 
radicalization of the West Coast union was rendered enduring by 
the cultural codification of the ItBig Strikew and "Bloody 
Thursdaytt (July 5, 1934), which was embodied in a highly self- 
conscious cohort of "34 mentt who remained a solid block of 
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* ,  support for the leftist leadership right through the 1950s, and 
4 whose prestige among the rank and file created a pervasively 
$ ,' 
%.a 
leftist and militant work culture on the docks.52 
Kimeldorfts book, as I read it, provides a largely implicit 
but potentially generalizable model of explanation in historical 
sociology. The model not only specifies multiple causes, but 
sorts out what might be characterized as different.registers of 
causation: preexisting structural conditions (cultural, social, 
and economic), conjunctural conditions (such as the generalized 
labor militancy of the 1 9 3 0 ~ ) ~  and contingent strategic or 
volitional actions -- which in turn may reconfigure preexisting 
structural conditions and create new structural conditions (by, 
for example, forming the solid block of influential '34 men who 
maintain the leftism of the ILWU.) Particularly interesting is 
Kimeldorffs discussion of how the Big Strike and the '34 men 
attained mythic stature -- through, among other things, annual 
work stoppages on July 5 to commemorate the union's formative 
battle.53 As Kimeldorfrs account shows, the Big Strike not only 
was an objectively important event in the formation of a radical 
union, but was also constructed as a subjectively important event 
& the radical union in subsequent months and years. This 
example demonstrates that the question of how events are 
retrospectively appropriated to reproduce structures is just as 
important for historical sociology as the question of how 
conjunctures and strategic action make transformative events 
possible in the first place. Events, Kimeldorf demonstrates, are 
constituted as well as constitutive. 
An Evenemential Sociology? 
The work of Traugott and Kimeldorf points toward an 
historical sociology in the evenemential mode. Such an 
evenemential sociology would recognize the path dependent, 
causally heterogeneous, and contingent nature of temporality, and 
would put the question of how structures are transformed or 
reconfigured by social action at the center of its inquiries. As 
my analysis of Wallerstein, Tilly, and Skocpol is intended to 
show, adopting an evenemential approach would not require 
jettisoning the work of those who have employed teleological or 
experimental conceptions of teleology. Rather than calling for a 
return to the drawing boards, I am arguing that we need to 
rethink the classical teleological and experimental studies, seek 
out the valuable evenemential analyses that have been masked by 
misconstrued scientific rhetoric, and rehabilitate such works as 
The Modern World Svstem, The Vendee, and States and Social 
Revolutions as rhetorically flawed masterworks of evenemential 
sociology. Here we might well find assistance in surprising 
quarters. Charles Tilly has recently published an article in 
which his central case for historical sociology rests on one of 
the central claims of the evenemential view of temporality: that 
"social processes are path dependent."54 And Immanuel 
Wallerstein has recently written an extremely radical and 
openended paper in calling for an "unthinking of the nineteenth 
century," in other words of the deeply held assumptions about 
social process that we have inherited from the nineteenth 
century. Although he does not include teleology as one of the 
assumptions that needs to be unthought, he does include "science 
itself,I1 and our preference for "elegant sparse lawsw over 
wcomplex, dense interpretive schema."55 These recent statements 
suggest that we may ourselves be in the midst of an event in the 
history the social sciences, one that will reconfigure previous 
structures of thought in sociology and other fields -- in the 
midst, in short, of an I1historic turn." 
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